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Business Group Prevalence and Impact Across Countries and Over Time: What Can We 
Learn from the Literature? 
Abstract: 
 
The business groups (BGs) literature has previously focused on the financial performance of its 
affiliates, relative to non-affiliated firms in the same country. However, when we consider the 
main predictions of the two theoretical perspectives on BGs, the institutional voids (IV) and 
entrenchment/exploitation view (EE), both rely to a significant extent on propositions about BG 
prevalence. Yet, surprisingly, there are almost no empirical studies that explore levels, impacts 
and time paths of prevalence. In this study, we therefore focus on BG prevalence both across 
countries and over time. We build a unique database by extracting estimates of BG prevalence 
for multiple countries between 1978 and 2012 from the existing literature, and use this to test 
conflicting predictions derived from the IV and EE perspectives respectively. We find no 
consistent evidence that BG prevalence diminishes over time with economic development, as 
institutional voids diminish, which is predicted by the IV perspective. Instead, the long term 
persistence of BGs in many countries appears to be more consistent with the EE perspective. 
However, we also find no support for the view that high levels of BG prevalence are negatively 
associated with country-level indicators and determinants of economic development and 
competitiveness, as suggested by that  perspective. We conclude that there is no robust support 
for either the IV or the EE view and highlight the need for more contextualised theorizing about 
the evolution of BGs.  
 
Keywords: business group prevalence, foreign direct i vestment, institutional voids, 
entrenchment, economic development, country competitiveness.  
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Introduction 
Business Groups  (BGs) are  a set of legally independent firms linked by ownership and a 
variety of other formal and informal ties which act in a coordinated manner (Granovetter, 2005 ; 
Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). They exist in most economies but are especially common in 
emerging markets (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). Because of their ubiquity and importance, an 
enormous amount of research has been undertaken on BGs to understand their effects on their 
host economies, including the consequences for internationalization and the nature of the 
competiton that they pose. To do this, most of the literature has focused on the question of 
whether group affiliation has a negative or a positive impact on the financial performance of 
member firms (Carney et al., 2011).  In this paper, we take a different approach to understanding 
the nature and impact of BGs by focusing on the notion of BG prevalence. BG prevalence 
measures the extent of BG presence within an economy, and it is a concept that is central to the 
understanding of whether the influence of BGs is beneficial or harmful to  growth and 
development of their host economies.  
There are sharp theoretical differences in the literature that revolve around BG 
prevalence. At one end of the spectrum is a literature associated with institutional voids (IV) 
theory (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). This takes a second-best view in 
arguing that group membership has a net positive effect on various aspects of an affiliated firm's 
performance, with the implication that high levels of BG prevalence may contribute to positive 
national development outcomes (Rodrick, 2008). However, that literature also suggests that BGs 
will become less prevalent as development proceeds and IVs are reduced. Thus, the IV 
perspective suggests that BG prevalence will diminish over time as countries develop more 
sophisticated institutions. At the opposite end of the spectrum are exploitation/entrenchment 
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(EE) theories that emphasize the negative net effect of affiliation, depicting the pyramidal 
structures and opaque governance of BGs as purpose built and designed for self-dealing and 
minority investor expropriation (Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan, 2002; Morck, et al, 2005; 
Young et al., 2008). In this view, entrenched BGs not only persist, but their continued  
prevalence also limits national development potential. These theories, therefore, present 
diametrically opposed predictions about how BG prevalence will change as an economy 
becomes more developed over time, as well as about the impact of BG prevalence on variables 
that impact national development and international competitiveness. We therefore in this paper 
provide evidence about the dynamic evolution of  BG prevalence and on the relationship 
between BG prevalence and outward FDI, inward FDI, national innovation, and financial market 
development. The latter are variables that have been widely used as measures and determinants 
of national competitiveness and economic development (Porter, 1990; Dunning, 1981; Dunning 
and Narula, 1996; Schwab, 2014).  Thus, we organize our study around two research questions. 
First we ask whether, over time and across countries, is there any tendency for BG prevalence to 
be diminished as institutional voids are closed.  Second, we ask what is the impact of  BG 
prevalence on country-level performance outcomes. 
While the broad social welfare effect of BG functioning was at the very centre of the 
initial IV research agenda (Khanna, 2000), subsequent scholarship has not systematically 
addressed either of our research questions. Indeed, , there are very few studies that provide 
explicit cross-national comparisons of BG functioning (see Belenzon, et al, 2013; Masulis, et al, 
2011), and only a small number that look at changes in BG prevalence over time, but within a 
single country (e.g. Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Lee, et al, 2008, Zattoni, et al, 2009). Such studies 
are rare primarily because of  the difficulties of assembling a comprehensive set of data. We 
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address this gap in a novel way by using the literature on BG affiliate performance to assemble a 
unique data set measuring BG prevalence across countries and over time. We combine results 
from multiple single-country studies into a single multi-country study by extracting data from all 
published articles on BGs in particular countries.  
Central to our study is the notion of BG prevalence. Prevalence measures the number of 
firms affiliated with a BG as a proportion of publicly listed firms in an economy. Our data set 
covers a large number of countries and includes within-country observations over time, thus 
providing an opportunity to provide a relatively comprehensive overview of the world's diverse 
population of BGs as well as an overview of the impact of group prevalence on country-level 
performance measures. In some countries, BGs have been studied intensively, and several 
estimates of the prevalence of group affiliation taken at different points in time allow us to 
identify trends in the levels of group affiliation. Our results suggest that there is considerable 
heterogeneity in BG prevalence and in their effects on country level performance outcomes. We 
find considerable evidence that BG prevalence varies across countries and over time. In 
particular, contrary to the prediction of the IV perspective,  there is no consistent evidence that 
BG prevalence diminishes over time when institutional voids are reduced. This observed 
tendency for persistence in many countries is more consistent with the EE perspective. However, 
contrary to the EE perspective, we also find no support for the view that BG prevalence is 
negatively related to various measures of country-level performance. At the same time our 
analysis also shows no consistent evidence for a positive impact of BG prevalence on economic 
outcomes, thus suggesting that countries can successfully develop with a variety of levels of BG 
prevalence. Thus, we provide a more nuanced view of BGs compared with that provided by 
much of the extant literature that focuses on firm-level, single-country analysis.  
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We view our approach as exploratory and aligned with what Cantwell and his colleagues 
(2010) describe as appreciative theory in the context of institutional approaches to international 
business. An appreciative approach ‘offers an analytical bridge between empirical investigation 
and formal models.’ Accordingly, we do not develop and formally test hypotheses, but rather 
present opposing accounts of BG functioning and consider their association with and potential 
impact upon institutions and other socioeconomic outcomes associated with the international 
competitiveness of a nation’s firms. Our contribution to the BG literature is twofold: first, we we 
provide comparative and temporal evidence about the impact of BGs on socioeconomic 
outcomes. Secondly we show theoretically and empirically that the two most widely applied 
theoretical approaches to BGs are limited, which highlights the need for further theoretical 
development taking closer account of country context. .  
We begin by describing our sample and then introduce the overall trends in BG 
prevalence in several economies. We then provide some exploratory estimates of the relationship 
between measures of institutional development and BG prevalence, our first research question. 
We go on to explore the relationship between prevalence and outward FDI (OFDI), inward FDI 
(IFDI), levels of national innovation and stock market development, our second research 
question. We conclude by explaining the impact of the findings for future research on BGs.  
Operationalizing BG Prevalence  
Empirical studies typically operationalize BG affiliation in terms of a dummy variable 
which divides the national population of listed firms into two distinct categories. Data on 
affiliation are frequently provided by country-specific institutions or stock market guides.1 While 
                                                           
1 For example the classification devised by the Center for Monitoring the India Economy; Dodwell Marketing 
Consultants classification of Industrial Groupings in Japan; Taiwan’s biennial directory Business Groups in Taiwan 
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these are likely to reflect country-specific idiosyncrasies, such definitions typically produce 
reliable year-to-year estimates of affiliation in a specific jurisdiction (Claessens, et al, 2006).  
Alternatively, other studies define affiliation by ownership; for example, Masulis and his 
colleagues (2011) apply a 20% ownership threshold to determine whether a firm is affiliated with 
a group but reduce the threshold in cases where a large shareholder also has other means of 
control such as being the firm’s founder CEO, or board chairman. Depending upon the control 
structure or ownership threshold selected, the estimated prevalence of group affiliation can vary 
considerably. Hence, assessing the prevalence of BG affiliation across countries and over time 
requires careful judgment and caution. 
To compile our sample, we therefore used five complementary search strategies to 
identify the population of studies that provide statistics on prevalence of group affiliates and 
nonaffiliates  in each country (Heugens, et al, 2009). First, we consulted a number of review 
articles and meta-analysis (Carney et al., 2011; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). Second, we searched 
five major electronic databases (ABI/INFORM Global, EconLit, Google Scholar, JSTOR, and 
SSRN) by using the following search terms: “business group,” “business houses,” “chaebol,” 
“grupos economicos,” “guanxiqiye,” “hongs,” “keiretsu,” “oligarchs,” “pyramids,” “qiye jituan”, 
and “zaibatsu”. Third, we conducted a manual search of journals in the disciplines of economics, 
finance, and management that periodically publish articles related to BGs. Fourth, after 
collecting an initial set of studies, we used a “snowballing” technique (Von Hippel, et al, 2009) 
that involved backward-tracking all the references reported in the articles and tracing forward all 
articles that cite the original articles by using Google Scholar. Fifth, we directly contacted 
authors of papers relevant to this topic who had not reported information on BG prevalence. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(BGT) compiled by the China Credit Information Service; Thailand's Brooker Group publication: Thai Business 
Groups. In Korea, the population of BGs is usually defined by Korean Foreign Trade commission’s annual 
determination of firms affiliated with the top 30 Chaebols. 
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After conducting these five steps and removing any manuscripts that used data identical to those 
of other studies, we arrived at a final sample of 150 BG studies that have compared group 
affiliates and nonaffiliated firms between 1978 and 2012. Each study provides one or multiple 
country-year estimates of prevalence of BG affiliation. Collectively, these studies yield 351 
prevalence/year estimates for 65 countries. For 26 countries, such as Algeria, Lebanon, Poland, 
Sri Lanka, and Ukraine, we have only a single estimate of prevalence. For 39 others, we have 
multiple estimates, and many Asian and Latin American countries have been studied intensively; 
for instance, we found 64 estimates for prevalence in South Korea, 36 in Japan, 28 in India, 26 in 
Chile and 7 in both Brazil and Colombia. 
However, this dataset of the full set of prevalence estimates has several drawbacks. First 
it contains duplicate observations for the same year in some countries, and in addition it is 
statistically ‘noisy’ because of the variation in the definition and operationalization of group 
affiliation in the population of studies. In an attempt to minimize these problems for our 
empirical work, we created two samples for estimation on the basis of the full dataset. The first 
sample contains the full set of all non-duplicated observations including all of the estimates of 
prevalence in all studies. This reduces the total number of observations from the 351 above  to 
266 prevalence-year estimates,  for example,  by cuttting the number of observations from South 
Korea from 64 to 19. 2 We further created a second sample in which we excluded both duplicate 
observations and prevalence estimates using a strict pyramid definition of group affiliation., 
resulting in a (maximum) sample size of 238 observations.3 Khanna and Yefeh (2007) suggest 
                                                           
2 This is the maximum sample size; the actual number of observations in any equations may be lower because of 
other missing data. 
3
 For the purposes of reliability one author collected and coded all the prevalence data. Two other authors checked 
the data and independently coded whether the observation should be included in second sample ‘all good 
observation. We obtained a high inter-rater agreement of .98 (Cohen's kappa coefficient).   
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pyramidal equity ties are atypical of group ties in many countries and are therefore likely to 
underestimate the prevalence of groups. As it turns out, the results were for the most part the 
same regardless of sample which allow us to report most results using only one sample and we 
choose the first which is larger and  excludes only duplicate observations. When the two samples 
generate different results, we report them both.  
Our empirical analysis concerns the relationship between BG prevalence and various 
indicators of national economic performances across countries and over time. Our sources for the 
latter variables are secondary; thus all of the performance, institutional, and control variables 
employed below are from widely used and available sources. These are summarized in Table 1. 
Country-Specific Trends in BG Prevalence  
The IV and EE hypotheses represent two prominent theories of the life cycle of BGs, but 
they offer competing views about expected group longevity and impact. The IV theory has two 
components: the first one suggests that BGs materialize to fill voids in market supporting 
infrastructure (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). The group structure enables affiliates to acquire 
resources that would be otherwise unavailable via arms-length contracting. The second one 
suggests that with the development of market supporting infrastructure, arms-length contracting 
will become feasible and the value of affiliation will erode (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). As their 
functional advantages erode, BGs are expected to focus, restructure, and loosen their ties. 
Ultimately, groups should unravel and disappear, as it becomes more profitable for firms to be 
unaffiliated because markets are able to provide the resources and capabilities more efficiently 
and cheaply than from within the BG. Under this scenario, group affiliation should become 
progressively less prevalent following institutional and economic development (Hoskisson et al., 
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2005; Lee et al., 2008). Based upon their confidence in the IV hypothesis, Khanna and Palepu 
(1999) build their policy advice on the expectation that BGs will fade away when they advocate 
“governments in developing countries must focus on building up those market institutions in the 
long term. The dismantling of business groups will, we believe, follow naturally once these 
institutions are in place” (1999: 126). Thus, as a functional economic response to 
underdevelopment, IV theory predicts that business groups are a transitional phenomenon.  
The EE hypothesis is based on the assumption that concentrated economic (monopoly) 
power in the hands of rent seeking BG owners will have negative consequences for a country as 
a whole (Morck et al., 2005). It also has two components: Morck et al (2005) propose that BGs 
are often initially formed by states to orchestrate a’ big push’ toward industrial modernization. 
However, with few exceptions, dominant BGs use their monopoly power to entrench themselves 
by capturing the commanding heights of the economy. Subsequently, these incumbents seek to 
defend their sources of rents by retaining the conditions that favor their economic and social 
prominence. Given their important role in the economy and the political powers that it entails, 
BG owners and elite politicians can attain a stable equilibrium (Schneider, 2009). As entrenched 
actors, both economic and political, they are able successfully to resist entry from outsiders and 
to extract surplus from minority shareholders and other potential stakeholders. In this view, BGs 
persist and remain prevalent among the economy's leading firms.  
Which of these contending hypotheses is best supported by our prevalence data? We 
depict overall trends in prevalence in each of 18 countries for which we had multiple but not 
duplicating prevalence observations by calculating linear least squares estimates of prevalence 
over time (reproduced in Figure 1). Overall, the sample shows slight upward trends in prevalence 
in Belgium, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, Peru, Singapore, Taiwan, 
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and Thailand and downward trends in Chile, Hong Kong, Philippines, Russia, and Turkey. What 
appears to be the case in Figure 1 is that, while BG prevalence may have declined in some 
countries, there is certainly no overall trend in that direction across countries and over time. 
To gain a finer grained picture we separately plot the least-squares line for several 
intensively studied countries, where there are sufficient observations. Figure 2 depicts individual 
trends in 8 countries, divided by countries in which BG prevalence increased, and countries in 
which it declines. Each point in Figure 2 represents a study’s estimate of prevalence for a 
particular year and country. The line is the best fitting regression for those estimates. For 
example, between 1998 and 2010 BG affiliation in China grew from 20% to 50%. In India, since 
the early 1990s, BG affiliation had a slight upward trend in a band between 40% and 55%. 
Taiwan and Japan show similar slight upward trends. Only in South Korea and Turkey is there a 
steep decline in affiliation but declines are also observed in Chile and Russia. Once again, there 
is no systematic evidence that BG prevalence is declining across a sample of countries or within 
many countries over time. 
Because economic development is highly correlated with many indicators of institutional 
development, we also plot prevalence against GDP per capita in Figure 3. In this case, the best 
fitting regression line is curvilinear. Most of the observations in our sample are in the less than 
$10,000 GDP per capita band since many of the observations are taken from countries at the 
early stages of economic development. Figure 3 suggests that BGs remain prevalent at relatively 
high levels of income and show no clear downward trend over time, as predicted by IV theory. 
Indeed, the overall picture reveals that BGs tend to persist across the world, albeit not in every 
country. The data in Figure 3 show no particular decline in BG prevalence at higher levels of 
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income per capita. A regression of BG prevalence on per capita GDP (unreported) indicates that 
there is no statistically significant relationship between these two variables.  
To explore this issue more thoroughly and to fully address our first research question, we 
analyze the relationship between BG prevalence and six of the most commonly used measures of 
institutional development, while controlling for the study from which the data was taken. 
Specifically, we estimate equations of the following form: 
 
(1)     ,  = 		1 + 	1,  + 	1,  + 	1,      
 
BGP is a measure of BG prevalence, INST is a measure of institutional development, 
CONTROLS is a set of control variables, t = time period, j = country. The coefficient of interest 
for our research question is 1. A negative sign would provide support for the IV perspective.  
Any other finding would provide evidence consistent with the entrenchment perspective. 
It is important to control for heteregeity in the underlying sample, and in particular the 
heterogeneity arising from differences in BG prevalence measurement across studies. In all the 
models which follow, we therefore include a variable indicating the paper from which the data 
were taken (remember that several papers provided measures for more than one country or 
multiple year observations). In addition, we control for the size of the firm population over 
which prevalence is measured. We do so because it is generally the case that firms affiliated with 
BGs are larger than the average population of unaffiliated firms. Therefore, when the prevalence 
of BGs is measured on a smaller population (usually the largest firms), as opposed to a larger 
population (all firms), the percentage of BGs will be higher in the former case. In addition, we 
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estimate all equations with and without country fixed effects. This rarely affects the results; we 
report the more stringent specifoifcation, namely the regressions with country fixed effects.  
As shown in Table 1, the first five measures of INST are taken from the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (World Bank), and the last one from the Combined Polity Index (Polity2). 
The five governance measures account for different aspects of institutional development 
(Globerman and Shapiro, 2003), while the Polity Index is a summary measure of the degree of 
democracy in a country (Knack, 2004). These estimates of equation (1), for six measures of 
INST, one reported for both samples, are reproduced in Table 2. Institutional quality typically 
improves as countries become more developed, so, from the IV perspective, we expect an 
inverse relationship between BG prevalence and each indicator of institutional development.  
However, the results in Table 2 provide no strong evidence that, BG prevalence is 
systematically related to institutional strength, across either countries or over time. This finding 
is robust to a variety of specifications:  the inclusion of country fixed effects; how institutional 
strength is measured across our six specifications; and, with one exception,  for both of our 
estimating samples. The columns (1), (2) and (4) – (7) report results from the first (larger) 
sample, while column (3) reports the only case for which the results differ between the two 
samples, containing the regression results of BG against political stability with the smaller 
sample. The relevant coefficients are not statistically significant in columns (1) and (3) – (7). 
However, consistent with the IV perspective, the Political Stability coefficient  is negative and 
statistically significant in our larger sample (Column 2). However, the same variable is  not 
statistically significant in the smaller sample (Column 3).   
Thus, we see virtually no support for the IV view that BGs will not persist over time as 
institutions develop; in fact, in many countries BG prevalence rises over time. Moreover, group 
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affiliation remains prevalent at high levels of GDP per capita (a variable closely associated with 
institutional development), implying that factors other than the filling institutional voids must 
explain the persistent prevalence of group affiliation. At the same time, our data provide some 
limited, but not unambiguous support for the EE perspective and Granovetter’s conclusion that 
“BGs have typically defied predictions of their imminent demise surviving the conscious 
attempts by politicians to break them up and the impact of financial crises” (2005: 445).  
Figure 1: BG prevalence trends in 18 countries 
Figure 2: BG prevalence trends in 7 countries 
Figure 3: BG prevalence and gross domestic product 
Table 1: Data and Sources 
Table 2: BG Prevalence and Institutions 
Prevalence and Country-level Economic Performance 
While performance effects of BG affiliation have attracted the lion’s share of the 
empirical attention (Claessens, et al, 2006; Estrin, et al, 2009; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Morck, 
et al, 2005), the impact of BG prevalence on national economic performance is subject to heated 
debate. Unfortunately,  the evidence on this important  question remains sparse. According to the 
advocates of a positive view, there are at least two ways that the prevalence of group affiliation 
can benefit country-level economic performance. The first is through simple aggregation logic: 
affiliation has positive effects on firm performance, so the greater the number of firms associated 
within BGs, the greater these positive effects. Specifically, in the context of institutional voids, 
BG's member firms enjoy superior allocative efficiency compared with unaffiliated firms, since 
affiliation gives the firm access to group mediated resources, such as investment capital and 
Page 13 of 46 Multinational Business Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Multinational Business Review
managerial know-how4. Thus, the IV perspective suggests that BG member firms, being more 
efficient by virtue of their access to group resources including capital and knowledge (Gerlach, 
1992; Keister, 1998), may create conditions supportive of innovation and international 
competitiveness. 
Second, there may be spillover benefits of BG prevalence. As powerful actors, BGs 
inevitably come into contact with multinational enterprises (MNEs), which facilitates acquisition 
of new capabilities and identification of foreign opportunities. These effects spill over into the 
wider economy as unaffiliated firms begin to emulate the behaviour of affiliated firms. BGs may 
also generate additional spillover effects that accelerate economic development. For example, 
they may create a pool of trained managers with company credentials, foster creation of 
competent stock analysts, facilitate building of industrial capacity, as well as communications 
and transportation infrastructure. In this way, BGs lower the costs of doing business for all firms, 
including those unaffiliated with a BG. Taken together these arguments suggest that from the IV 
perspective: BG prevalence will be positively associated with various measures of national 
economic performance. 
In contrast, the EE perspective suggests two ways in which BG prevalence can harm 
country-level economic welfare. While conceding that BGs might provide positive welfare 
effects in the early stages of economic development, the suggestion is that at later stages of 
economic development, BGs subsequently actively suppress or passively inhibit sustained 
growth and competitiveness. The EE perspective provides an elite capture theory that considers 
BG prevalence as facilitating the concentration and coordination of economic power in the hands 
                                                           
4 But this scenario provides only a partial equilibrium (Kali, 1999). Full equilibrium requires every firm in the 
economy to join a group. However, there are increasing coordination costs with group scale and scope (Hoskisson et 
al., 2005), where the addition of new firms outweigh the available benefits, therefore some proportion of firms fail 
to join groups producing a partial equilibrium outcome at some level of prevalence.  
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of a few families. In this view, institutional development becomes endogenous (Morck et al., 
2005): concentrated economic power is wielded to entrench the status and positions of elite 
actors and to reduce positive spillovers by actively inhibiting the entry of business rivals and 
preventing the emergence of institutions favoring market competition. Thus, EE theory argues 
that rent seeking behavior by BGs can produce negative country level outcomes, including 
restricting international capital flows (Morck et al., 2005), inhibiting innovation (Mahmood and 
Mitchell, 2004), and retarding the emergence of external capital markets (Almeida and 
Wolfenzon, 2006). Thus, the EE perspective suggests that: BG prevalence will be negatively 
associated with the measures of national economic performance. 
We note that a similar view to the EE perspective is provided by the Varieties of 
Capitalism (VOC) approach (Hall and Soskice, 2001). The VoC perspective views BG 
prevalence as an outcome of complementarities between the state, labor, and corporate elites. 
These groups are constructed at the early stages of economic development to address national 
coordination problems, such as wage setting. However subsequently these relationships become 
locked in and thus foreclose the emergence of new complementarities, such as flexible labor 
markets, which will be necessary as the economy becomes more developed (Schneider, 2009). 
BG prevalence will therefore be associated with negative performance effects through a 
‘crowding out’ mechanism, in which the dominance of a single organizational form limits the 
evolution of diversity and economic specialization in the economy. In this view, the BGs may 
hamper the emergence of alternative corporate forms by depriving them of niches in which to 
specialize, and these negative effects will be amplified when BGs are highly prevalent.  
To address this issue empirically, we estimate a series of equations of the form:  
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(2)     ,  = 		2 + 	2,  + 	2,  + 	2,      
 
OUT is an outcome performance measure; we focus upon OFDI, IFDI, patents, or stock 
market development.  As in the estimation of equation (1) above, each regression contains a 
number of variables that control for factors that might affect the relevant outcome variable 
(discussed below for each equation) as well as the previously discussed set of variables about the 
study from which the data were taken, as used in the estimates of equation (1). 
We are interested in the sign and significance of 2. A negative sign indicates that high 
levels of BG prevalence are associated with lower levels of IFDI, OFDI, patents and stock 
market development, broadly consistent with the entrenchment view. A positive sign suggests 
the opposite, although we note that both perspectives are in agreement that BG prevalence 
should be negatively associated with stock market development because the IV perspective 
partially views BGs as a substitute for missing domestic capital markets (Khanna and Palepu, 
2000). . 
 
BG Prevalence and Outward FDI (OFDI) 
We first consider the effects of group affiliation on OFDI. As discussed above, the IV 
perspective suggests that, in the absence of market supporting. institutions, affiliation with a BG 
can provide superior access to a range of resources including capital, skilled human resources, 
technological and organizational know-how that are unavailable to unaffiliated firms. Other 
things equal, this perspective implies that affiliates have competitive advantages relative to 
unaffiliated firms. Thus, group affiliation is credited with boosting national industrial capacity by 
organizing export-oriented firms and helping firms acquire advanced technology (Guillen, 2000), 
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as well as providing project management skills to help firms enter new markets (Amsden and 
Hikino, 1994). Over the past decade, scholars have documented the pioneering effects of group 
affiliates in engaging in FDI and becoming emerging-market multinationals (Matthews, 2006). 
Since many emerging market multinational enterprises invest overseas to acquire strategic assets 
rather than to exploit firm specific capabilities, BG affiliation may provide a springboard to 
foreign markets (Luo and Tung, 2007; Yiu, et al., 2005).  
More recently, research has emphasized BG affiliation as a mechanism for competing in 
globally deregulated industries by developing advanced capabilities consistent with international 
standards of competitiveness. In this view, multiple ties among affiliates, including buyer 
supplier equity and director ties, facilitate individual and complementary combination effects 
with respect to the development of the R&D capabilities required to be internationally 
competitive (Mahmood, et al, 2011). Relatedly, group affiliation allows firms to access and 
leverage market knowledge and international connections in their sister affiliates (Lamin, 2013). 
In a longitudinal study of Indian firms, Chari (2013) found that group affiliates were more likely 
to engage in FDI than were unaffiliated firms. The consensus arising from this stream of research 
is that BG affiliates are in the vanguard of economic development and represent the country's 
most competitive firms. 
These perspectives and findings suggest that unaffiliated firms will be less able to access 
the resources needed to internationalize their activities in globally competitive industries. 
Collectively, this literature points out that there is greater likelihood that firms affiliated with 
groups will have access to the resources and capabilities needed to support OFDI. Therefore, by 
the logic of aggregation discussed above, this reasoning suggests that: the greater the degree of 
BG affiliation in an economy, the greater the level of OFDI.  
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In contrast, we noted that the EE perspective highlights potentially negative attributes of 
group affiliation, and how these might suppress incentives and capacities to internationalize 
activity. First, controlling shareholders may undermine the competitive potential of their 
affiliates by extracting or tunneling resources from them (Bertrand, et al , 2002). Others 
emphasize the BGs’ potential to exploit linkages with political elites for personal gain in 
countries where a relatively small number of business families control significant shares of the 
economy (Claessens, et al, 2000). Oligarchic family BGs can use their economic power to 
extract resources from government (Faccio, 2006) through corporate bailouts (Faccio, et al, 
2006), rent seeking (Fisman, 2001), or inhibiting competition from domestic and international 
rivals (Fogel, 2006). Receiving an assured stream of rents, these business owners have limited 
incentive to seek investment opportunities beyond their borders where the possibilities for rent 
extraction are less auspicious and the likely returns much lower. Indeed, successful rent seeking 
strategies may displace emphasis on developing alternative sources of competitive advantage.  
 More recently, studies that are not explicitly in the EE tradition have identified several 
factors that inhibit BG affiliates’ OFDI. Specifically, due to the dense multiplex linkages with 
other businesses in their domestic environments, group affiliates can become overly embedded in 
a set of country-specific institutions (Pedersen and Stucchi, 2015). A related argument suggests 
that family BGs engage in domestic product diversification on the basis of the reputation of a 
family/reputable entrepreneur. However, reputations are highly localized phenomena, not easily 
transferable across borders. Indeed, product diversification and international expansion may 
present firms with an inherent trade-off (Kumar, et al, 2012), and locally diversified firms may 
be required to refocus their business portfolio before they engage in international expansion 
(Meyer, 2006). Tan and Meyer (2010) find that extensive political and business ties with local 
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actors drive domestic growth and inhibit international expansion. In particular, they conclude 
that government ownership in any group discourages internationalization of group-affiliated 
firms. Implicit in these perspectives is the idea that unaffiliated firms are not exposed to the 
negative impact of group membership on internationalization. Thus, contrary to the IV 
perspective the prevalence of BG affiliated firms is expected to be associated with lower levels 
of OFDI.   
A variety of estimates of equation (2) using the larger sample are reported in Table 3 to 
illustrate the robust nature of our findings. We report various specifications noting that the 
number of observations varies according to the inclusion of further control variables, as defined 
in Table 1. The dependent variable, OFDI is measured in logarithms because of the non-
normality of the distribution. We also note that the sample size is reduced from the one reported 
above because of missing values. The basic specification in column (1) controls only for cross-
study differences in the underlying dataset by including a variable indicating the paper from 
which the data was taken and the size of the firm over population in which prevalence is 
measured. This is extended in column (2) to include a direct measure of government policy, in 
this case the OFDI restrictions index compiled by the IMF. Column (3) further includes  GDP 
per capita (lagged one period) to control for a variety of country effects including macro-
economic policy and institutional development. Finally in column (4) we also include a direct 
measure of institutional development, the Freedom House Index, a summary measure compiled 
by the Heritage Foundation (defined in Table 1).  
We show in Table 3 that in all these specifications the coefficient on the BG prevalence 
term is positive and statistically significant in all specifications. This implies that, consistent with 
the arguments from the IV perspective, BGs are capable of generating internationally 
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competitive firm capabilities. We find no evidence supporting the view, from the EE perspective,  
that higher levels of BG presence are associated with reduced OFDI flows from a country. 
It is important to note that these positive results are obtained while controlling for GDP 
per capita, which has a consistently positive and statistically significant effect on OFDI flows, as 
well as controlling for institutional quality. In this sense, our results are robust to heterogeneity 
across countries5. At the very least, BG prevalence on average has a positive association with a 
country’s OFDI position at any point in time. Our evidence therefore does not favor the EE 
perspective. 
Table 3: BG Prevalence and OFDI 
BG Prevalence and Inward FDI (IFDI) 
There is very little literature that directly connects BG prevalence with IFDI. However, 
there is an extensive literature linking IFDI to variables that reflect national competitiveness 
(Bevan and Estrin, 2004; Globerman and Shapiro, 2002). Moreover, there is evidence that such 
inflows benefit the home economy through knowledge spillovers, resource transfers, and 
enhanced competition (Li, et al, 2012). In addition, inward FDI can be particularly effective in 
encouraging industrial restructuring (Dunning and Narula, 1996), which is an important 
antecedent of OFDI by BGs (Meyer, 2006). That is, IFDI can encourage domestic firms to be 
more competitive. How does BG prevalence affect these processes? The IV perspective 
primarily considers the firm-level advantages generated by internal markets, which can provide 
affiliates with superior access to knowledge, capital, and labour. However, this perspective views 
BGs as an efficient market organisation within the context of institutional voids, and therefore, 
probably one keen to exploit the learning possibilities and technologies brought to the domestic 
                                                           
5 However, we cannot claim causality for these results, which do not derive from a formal model linking the 
development process, institutional development, and BG evolution. 
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economy by IFDI. As such, the IV perspective provides no suggestion that BGs will actively 
oppose inward FDI, and may even be inclined to cooperate with foreign entrants to gain access 
to knowledge (Nolte and Vliegenthart, 2009; Schneider, 2009). Thus, from the IV perspective: 
IFDI is likely to be either unaffected or even mildly encouraged by higher levels of BG 
prevalence.  
In contrast, the EE perspective would suggest that entrenched BGs use their political 
power to limit foreign competition and restrict IFDI (Estrin, et al, 2016; Morck et al., 2005; 
Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Perhaps the most salient argument here is elite capture, an argument 
that emphasizes the suppressing effects of oligarchic BGs dominating the economy. The 
argument is a direct corollary of the EE hypothesis (Morck et al., 2005). In this view, politically 
connected BGs gain access to national monopolies through quid-pro-quo agreements with 
political actors. The dependence on domestic markets is exacerbated and provides BGs with a 
strong incentive to resist encroachment on their domestic terrain. BGs are keen to minimize 
competition, and they will be particularly concerned with erecting barriers to the entry of foreign 
rivals. BGs will oppose institutional and regulatory developments that threaten their dominant 
positions and this will lead to a reduced presence of foreign multinational enterprises (Rajan and 
Zingales, 2003). Hence, from the EE perspective, higher levels of BG prevalence should be 
associated with lower levels of IFDI.  
It is important to recognize that many emerging market countries seek to accelerate their 
economic development by encouraging IFDI to stimulate the transfer of technology and 
managerial expertise. The international economics literature finds that such investment can 
contribute to growth relatively more than domestic investment (Sabirianova, et al, 2005). IFDI 
may be particularly effective in encouraging industrial restructuring (Dunning and Narula, 1996, 
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which is an important antecedent of OFDI by BGs (Meyer, 2006). However, several East Asian 
economies, such as Japan and Korea, actively discouraged IFDI in the early stages of 
development as a means of developing domestic capabilities (Amsden, 1989; Gerlach, 1992). 
Therefore, the relationship between levels of BG prevalence and IFDI must consider the role of 
IFDI policy. 
We report the results of estimating equation (2) with IFDI as the dependent variable in 
Table 4. The chosen specifications take the same structure as in Table 3,  with one exception. 
The discussion above suggests that government policy with respect to IFDI can be important and 
so in Table 4 we include a direct measure of government policy, in this case the IFDI restrictions 
index compiled by the IMF.  
The results with respect to the control variables conforms with expectations. Inward FDI 
is positively associated with the level of development (GDP per capita) and the controls for 
sample quality. Inward FDI is deterred by lower levels of freedom; the Freedom House variable 
is measured from low (high levels of freedom) to high (low levels of freedom). Our theoretical 
concern is with the coefficient on the BG variable, which is found not to be statistically 
significant in any specification.  Thus there is no statistically significant relationship between BG 
prevalence and inward FDI, regardless of the controls employed. These results are certainly not 
supportive of the EE perspective, but are  broadly consistent with the IV argument. 
Table 4: BG Prevalence and IFDI 
 
BG Group Prevalence and Innovation 
The literature relevant to the question of the relation between BG prevalence and 
innovation raises issues similar to those already discussed with respect to FDI. Several studies in 
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the IV tradition propose that BGs protect member property rights and so facilitate market-
oriented innovation among affiliates (Chang and Hong, 2000; White, et al, 2008), suggesting that 
high-performing BGs will support innovative activities that strengthen their competitiveness. 
Similarly, at low levels of BG prevalence, affiliates will face stronger competition from 
unaffiliated firms and have a greater incentive to invest in innovation (Mahmood and Mitchell, 
2004). One reason for this is that profitable BG's may function as venture capitalists, a market 
often absent in emerging economies, by using their free cash flow to fund new innovative 
startups (Masulis et al., 2011). Belenzon and Berkovitz (2010) find that affiliates of business 
groups are more innovative than standalones, and attribute this result to internal capital markets.  
At the same time, it is recognized that if BGs facilitate innovation by filling a void in 
venture capital markets, this may occur only at low levels of BG prevalence (Mahmood and 
Mitchell, 2004). When BG's account for a large share of the economy's activities, they may 
instead hinder innovation by erecting barriers to entry for new firms which experiment with new 
business models (Gerlach,1992). Facing less competition from unaffiliated firms also allows BG 
to become entrenched as suggested by the EE perspective. Under these circumstances BG's may 
seek to protect existing sources of rent which will inhibit their incentives for innovation (Chang, 
Chung, and Mahmood, 2006). BGs will have little incentive to fund R&D expenditures and other 
activities such as patenting new technologies because, at high levels of prevalence, there is an 
increased probability that one affiliate’s innovation will cannibalize another affiliate’s products 
(Mahmood and Mitchell, 2004). This argument suggests that high levels of prevalence will 
reinforce the selection environment for BGs generic capabilities and weaken selection for firm 
specific advanced product and process innovations (Kock and Guillen, 2001). In addition, to the 
extent that BGs access technology through joint ventures with foreign companies, they may have 
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limited interest in supporting the development of intellectual property rights that incentivize local 
scientific endeavor (Schneider, 2009).  
Thus, an IV perspective suggests that: the prevalence of BGs can enhance innovation at 
the country level by filling missing venture capital markets. The contrary EE view suggests that: 
high levels of BG prevalence are likely to hamper national innovation efforts.  
In Table 5 we provide estimates of equation (2)  using patents granted (in logs), a 
commonly used indicator of national innovation, as the outcome performance variable. We 
report four specifications paralleling those in Tables 3 and 4, except that in this case we include a 
control variable for innovation inputs, the ratio of R&D expenditures to GDP. All other control 
variables have been presented above. 
The results in Table 5 provide no evidence that BG prevalence is related to innovative 
activity. The coefficient on BG prevalence is not statistically significant in any regression in 
Table 5, nor in numerous other unreported regressions. Otherwise the results conform with 
expectations; patents increase with GDP per capita and with innovation inputs. While the IV 
perspective is somewhat ambiguous in its prediction about the predicted relationship between 
innovation and BG prevalence, our evidence is once again not consistent with the EE perspective 
on this issue. 
Table 5: BG Prevalence and Innovation 
 
BG Prevalence and the Development of Stock Markets 
Finally, we consider the effect of BG prevalence on the development of external capital 
markets. Both the EE and IV perspectives tend to imply that BGs and their associated internal 
capital markets will form when external capital markets are underdeveloped. However, they 
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diverge in their predictions about the dynamic relationship between the two. The IV perspective 
suggests that as the economy develops, larger and more efficient external capital markets will 
gradually replace the internal capital markets represent by the BG structure. Hence, the 
development of the external capital market will act to reduce the prevalence of BGs. However, 
the EE perspective suggests that BGs will prevent the emergence of a competitive capital market, 
and capital market development will thus not occur. Consequently, the prediction is the same; 
high levels of capital market development will be associated with low levels of BG prevalence 
and vice versa, but, in this case, the relationship will not be generated by the same dynamic 
considerations.  
Some of the finance literature points to potential negative economic consequences 
associated with extensive group affiliation and their reliance on internal capital markets. Early 
research associated BG internal capital markets with inefficient investment outcomes as groups 
were argued to support weak underperforming firms at the expense of better external 
opportunities (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) develop a 
theoretical model suggesting that substantial group affiliation in an economy hampers the 
allocative efficiency of external capital markets thereby contributing to their under-development. 
In this view high levels of affiliation produce strong feedback effects because when new firms 
expect others to join BGs, they are more likely to do so as well since there are few alternative 
sources of capital to fund new ventures. Thus BG prevalence limits the emergence of efficient 
external capital markets. 
However, other research affirms the beneficial effects of BGs in the context of weak 
capital markets. Under these circumstances BGs offer their affiliates preferential access to group 
mediated resources that are unavailable through arms-length transactions in external capital 
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markets. Thus, where capital markets are illiquid and underdeveloped, BGs’ internal capital 
markets provide venture capital to startups (Masulis et al., 2011) and extend credit to distressed 
firms (Jia, et al, 2013). BGs internal markets are found to be especially valuable for capital 
intensive firms, with a high need for external finance, in countries where equity markets are 
poorly developed (Belenzon et al., 2013). These arguments support the view that BGs may be 
associated with less developed capital markets, not because they are inefficient, but because they 
are efficient, both in funding startups and in extending credit to high risk firms. Similar views are 
expressed by Schneider (2009) who suggests that developing economies dominated by BGs 
become reliant on their internal capital markets. 
Thus, whether one accepts a positive or negative interpretation of BG functioning, there 
seems to be a consensus between the perspectives that: the prevalence of BGs will be associated 
with less developed external equity markets.  
We estimate this final version of equation (2) using  stock market capitalization as our 
outcome performance variable and following the same broad specification structure as in Tables 
3 to 5,  with the Freedom House financial freedom index replacing the broader freedom index as 
the additional institutional variable. Contrary to the predcitons from the EE perspective, we find 
no evidence in any of the specifications of a negative relationship between stock market 
capitalization and BG prevalence. Indeed, the relevant coefficient is always positive, and when 
we do not control for per capita GDP, it is statistically significant. The significant control 
variables conform with expectations. Thus, in our regressions we find no evidence to support the 
idea that the internal capital markets, typically associated with BGs, are also linked with under-
capitalized external financial markets. 
Table 6: BG Prevalence and Stock Market Development 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
BGs are a prominent feature of the business landscape in developing countries, where 
they have been accorded more attention, but also in more mature economies. Nevertheless, both 
the degree of their persistence and their impact upon country economic performance remain 
unsettled areas of research. As such, there has been no consistent evidence to support either side 
of the competing narratives that we have described in this paper.  
To take the discussion further we have gathered data from 150 existing studies regarding 
the level and persistence of BG prevalence across countries over the last 30 years, and use these 
data to explore two major questions that have not been fully addressed in the literature. First, 
over time and across countries, is there any tendency for BG prevalence to be diminished as 
institutional voids are closed?  Second, does BG prevalence have an impact on country-level 
outcomes associated with national competitiveness and economic development?  
We situate these questions in the context of the differing views of BGs provided by the 
IV and EE perspectives. In brief, the IV perspective suggests that BGs will tend to dissolve as 
national institutions develop, but their prevalence may contribute positively to country level 
outcomes. In contrast, the EE perspective suggests that BGs persist, and this persistence is linked 
to behaviors that do not result in positive national outcomes. In addition, neither perspective is 
fully comfortable with the international investments of BGs. Our results offer an original 
contribution to the debate on the nature and impact of BGs.  
We find that, while levels of prevalence do vary significantly around the world, in many 
cases BGs also persist over long periods of time. Our analysis provides little evidence that BGs 
disappear on average, and only in a few cases do we find that group affiliation tends to decrease 
in importance for the national economy, even though income levels have increased considerably 
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over the period and majority of institutions have strengthened. This appears to support the EE 
over the IV perspective.  
At the same time, we find no evidence that high levels of prevalence have negative 
effects on the country-level indicators we examine, which tends to supports the IV over the EE 
perspective. Indeed, there is some evidence that prevalence has a positive effect on outward FDI, 
and perhaps on the development of capital markets. Thus, we conclude that the prevalence of 
BGs seems on balance to facilitate their economies’ participation in the global economy and little 
evidence that BG prevalence locks them into autarkic isolation. Put otherwise, we find no 
evidence that BG prevalence impedes national competitiveness or the factors that might 
contribute to it. 
Therefore, the evidence we provide does not show unambiguous support for either the 
positive or negative narratives surrounding group prevalence. The positive IV narrative holds 
that BGs materialize to fill institutional voids with consequent positive effects on economic 
development but, subsequently, groups should unbundle and disappear once market supporting 
institutions emerge to support the effective functioning of freestanding firms. Since our data 
show nonnegative or positive associations between group prevalence and capital flows as well as 
capital market development, the evidence is consistent with the positive IV narrative. However, 
our finding that BGs do not unbundle and disappear, but persist over time is inconsistent with the 
same narrative. Indeed, evidence of persistence would seem to support the negative narrative 
articulated by EE perspective. However, the fact that high levels of group prevalence are also 
found in mature economies contradicts the negative narrative that groups are associated with 
ensnaring the economy into a middle-income trap. Similarly, the positive association of BG 
prevalence with various country performance indicators also speaks against the negative 
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narrative, and suggests that BG persistence is not on average the consequence of behaviors that 
support entrenchment. Our results are exploratory. The use of data extracted from other 
published articles is a different, and we hope promising way, to survey the literature, but we 
recognize that it raises concerns about the quality of the data. We therefore encourage future 
research that futher explores this method of obtaining data. 
With this caveat in mind, our results do suggest that a polarized characterization of BGs 
with respect to their host countries’ economic development and integration with the global 
economy is too coarse. Indeed, our main conclusion is that the two apparently competing 
narratives that we have explored should perhaps be seen as potential outcomes of a broader 
theory that is as yet elusive. Although the evidence presented in this paper suggests that BGs are 
in general development-friendly, or at least are not development unfriendly, we recognize that 
there is considerable cross-country variation in both BG prevalence and its effects on country 
performance. Thus, we suggest that theoretical approach to BGs should be developed that 
implies no necessary convergence to a “standard” global model (Hansmann and Kraakman, 
2004), but rather one that allows for a variety of institutions and corporate forms to co-exist in 
various proportions.  Thus research focused on understanding how “varieties of ownership 
forms” co-exist and evolve in different countries seems a fruitful area of future research. At the 
same time, our results suggest that the relationship among firm- and country-specific advantages 
(Porter, 1990; Rugman, 1981; Rugman, et al, 2012) also remains a fertile area for future 
research. As a prevalent economic and social institution, BGs are likely bear a complex and 
multifaceted relationship with their host economies, and we suspect the identification of their 
merits and failings will occupy corporate governance and international business scholars for 
some time to come.  
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Table 1: Data and Sources 
 
Variable Source 
GDP per Capita GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the 
sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product 
taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated 
without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. 
World Bank, various years: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD 
Control of Corruption Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grant forms of corruption, as well 
as capture of the state by elites and private interest. Estimate gives the country's score 
on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from 
approximately -2.5 to 2.5. 
World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators, various years: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx - home 
Political Stability Political stability capturing perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or 
politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. Estimate gives the country's score 
on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from 
approximately -2.5 to 2.5. 
World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators, various years: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx - home 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Government effectiveness capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, 
the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies. Estimate gives the country's score on the 
aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from 
approximately -2.5 to 2.5. 
World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators, various years: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx - home 
Regulatory Quality Regulatory Quality capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a 
standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. 
World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators, various years: 
(http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx - home 
Rule of Law Rule of Law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a 
Page 36 of 46Multinational Business Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Multinational Business Review
2 
 
standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. 
World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators, various years: 
(http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx - home 
Polity Combined Index Polity IV, contains coded annual information on the level of democracy for all 
independent states with greater than 500,000 total population and covers the years 
1800–2013. Polity's conclusions about a state's level of democracy are based on an 
evaluation of that state's elections for competitiveness and openness, the nature of 
political participation in general, and the extent of checks on executive authority. For 
each year and country, a "Polity Score" is determined which ranges from -10 to +10, 
with -10 to -6 corresponding to autocracies, -5 to 5 corresponding to anocracies, and 6 
to 10 to democracies. 
 
Centre for Systematic Peace, Polity IV Project, various years:  
http://www.systemicpeace.org/ 
Inward and outward FDI 
(log millions US dollars) 
Data on FDI flows are on a net basis (capital transactions´ credits less debits between 
direct investors and their foreign affiliates). Net decreases in assets (FDI outward) or 
net increases in liabilities (FDI inward) are recorded as credits (recorded with a positive 
sign in the balance of payments), while net increases in assets or net decreases in 
liabilities are recorded as debits (recorded with a negative sign in the balance of 
payments). 
 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, various years: 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Investment%20and%20Enterprise/FDI_Flows.aspx 
Patents granted (log of 
patent activity) 
International applications by origin via the PCT, Madrid and  
Hague Systems 
 
World intellectual property organization, various years:  
www.wipo.int 
Stock market 
capitalization 
Market capitalization (also known as market value) is the share price times the number 
of shares outstanding. Listed domestic companies are the domestically incorporated 
companies listed on the country's stock exchanges at the end of the year. Listed 
companies does not include investment companies, mutual funds, or other collective 
investment vehicles. Data are in current U.S. dollars. 
World Bank, various years: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.GD.ZS/countries 
FDI restrictions index 
(inflows) 
This dataset reports the presence or absence of capital controls, on an annual basis, for 
100 countries over the period 1995 to 2013. The information on capital controls is 
disaggregated both by whether the controls are on inflows or outflows, and by 10 
different categories of assets. We use dii Direct Investment Controls on Inflows 
Capital Control Measures: A New Dataset (FKRSU), A. Fernandez, M. Klein, A. 
Rebucci, M. Schindler, M. Uribe, IMF, April 2015 (kai) 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1580.pdf 
FDI restrictions index 
(outflows) 
This dataset reports the presence or absence of capital controls, on an annual basis, for 
100 countries over the period 1995 to 2013. The information on capital controls is 
disaggregated both by whether the controls are on inflows or outflows, and by 10 
different categories of assets. We use dio Direct Investment Controls on Outflows 
Capital Control Measures: A New Dataset (FKRSU), A. Fernandez, M. Klein, A. 
Rebucci, M. Schindler, M. Uribe, IMF, April 2015 (kao) 
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http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1580.pdf 
R&D as % of GDP Expenditures for research and development are current and capital expenditures (both 
public and private) on creative work undertaken systematically to increase knowledge, 
including knowledge of humanity, culture, and society, and the use of knowledge for 
new applications. R&D covers basic research, applied research, and experimental 
development. 
World Bank, various years http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS 
Heritage Foundation, 
Index of Investment 
Freedom 
The Index evaluates a variety of restrictions that are typically imposed on investment. It 
is not necessary for a government to impose all of the listed restrictions at the 
maximum level to effectively eliminate investment freedom. Those few governments 
that impose so many restrictions that they total more than 100 points in deductions have 
had their scores set at zero. 
Heritage Foundation, various years:                      
(http://www.heritage.org/index/explore) 
Freedom House Index The survey measures freedom—the opportunity to act spontaneously in a variety of 
fields outside the control of the government and other centers of potential 
domination—according to two broad categories: political rights and civil liberties. 
Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the 
right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public 
office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a 
decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. Civil liberties 
allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, 
rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state. 
Freedom House , various years:                       
(https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2015) 
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Table 2: BG Prevalence and Institutions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
VARIABLES Control  
Corruption 
Political 
Stability 
Political 
Stability 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulatory Quality Rule of Law Polity Index 
        
Paper number -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Firm (year) observations 
 
-0.000 
 
-0.000 
 
-0.000*** 
 
-0.000 
 
-0.000 
 
-0.000 
 
-0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Institutional Variable 
 
-0.082 
 
-0.219* 
 
-0.053 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.028 
 
-0.064 
 
0.003 
 (0.059) (0.111) (0.065) (0.059) (0.057) (0.052) (0.006) 
 
 
Observations 
 
 
163 
 
 
146 
 
 
118 
 
 
163 
 
 
163 
 
 
166 
 
 
266 
R-squared 0.599 0.645 0.662 0.592 0.593 0.594 0.459 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
        
Dependent Variable is Percentage of BG Firms 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: BG Prevalence and OFDI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include country fixed effects. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable is 
Log of Outward FDI 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Percentage BG firms 1.932*** 2.073*** 1.268** 1.498*** 
 (0.580) (0.635) (0.594) (0.531) 
Paper number 0.008*** 0.006** 0.003 0.003** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Firm (year) observations 0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Overall outflow 
restrictions index 
 -0.041 
(0.706) 
0.545 
(0.672) 
 
     
GDP per capita (t-1)   0.000*** 0.000*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Freedom_index_t    -0.020 
    (0.043) 
Observations 266 147 147 175 
R-squared 0.807 0.863 0.877 0.887 
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Table 4: BG Prevalence and IFDI 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include country fixed effects. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Dependent Variable is 
Log of FDI Inflows ($US) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Percentage BG firms 0.337 0.260 -0.470 0.017 
 (0.498) (0.615) (0.645) (0.437) 
Paper number 0.007*** 0.003* 0.000 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Firm (year) observations 0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Overall inflow restrictions 
index 
 -0.471 
(0.374) 
-0.031 
(0.349) 
 
     
GDP per capita (t-1)   0.000*** 0.000*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Freedom_index_t    -0.067* 
    (0.039) 
Observations 270 151 151 179 
R-squared 0.715 0.817 0.848 0.860 
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Table 5: BG Prevalence and Innovation 
 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include country fixed effects. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable is 
Log of Patent Grants 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Percentage BG firms -0.296 0.462 0.473 0.051 
 (0.334) (0.327) (0.352) (0.458) 
Paper number 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Firm (year) observations 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
 0.973* 
(0.511) 
0.987* 
(0.545) 
 
GDP per capita (t-1)   -0.000 0.000*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Freedom_index_t    0.015 
    (0.026) 
Observations 213 133 133 171 
R-squared 0.904 0.948 0.948 0.935 
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Table 6: BG Prevalence and Stock Market Development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include country fixed effects. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Dependent Variable is 
Log of Stock Market 
Capitalization ($US) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Percentage BG firms 0.931** 1.103** 0.750 0.742 
 (0.438) (0.492) (0.494) (0.538) 
Paper number 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Firm (year) 
observations 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Freedon House 
financialfreedom_t 
 -0.008 
(0.010) 
-0.009 
(0.009) 
 
GDP per capita (t-1)    0.000*** 0.000*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Freedom_index_t    -0.001 
    (0.027) 
Observations 216 180 180 180 
R-squared 0.874 0.888 0.906 0.905 
Page 43 of 46 Multinational Business Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Multinational Business Review
9 
 
 
 
Figure 1: BG: prevalence trends in 18 countries 
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Figure 2: Prevalence trends in eight countries* 
 
 
* Upper Figure shows increasing BG prevalence in China, India, Japan and Taiwan. Lower Figure 
show decreasing BG prevalence in Chile, Russia, South Korea and Turkey.  
BG prevalence also increases in Belgium, Brazil, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Peru, Singapore, and 
Thailand. BG prevalence also decreases in Hong Kong and Philippines 
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Figure 3: business group prevalence and per capita GDP 
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